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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCHWARZER, District Judge 
 
Plaintiffs Grant and Warren, through their parents, 
brought this action against the Cumberland Valley School 
District (District) under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. SS 1400-1491o (1994), to 
recover reimbursement of private school tuition and the 
cost of independent educational evaluations (IEEs) of 
plaintiffs. The District Court, on cross-motions for 
summary judgment, affirmed the decisions of a Special 
Education Appeals Panel (Panel) granting the request for 
tuition reimbursement but limiting the amount on equitable 
grounds, and reversed the decision denying reimbursement 
for the cost of the IEEs. Plaintiffs appeal and the District 
cross-appeals. We hold that the IDEA did not permit 
reduction of tuition reimbursement to which plaintiffs are 
otherwise entitled based on an assessment of the relative 
reasonableness of the parties' conduct. We further hold 
that plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement for the IEEs, 
the District having failed to establish that its evaluations 
were appropriate. 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Warren and Grant are both gifted students with learning 
disabilities. For several years they attended public school in 
the District, which provided them with individual 
educational programs (IEPs) as required by the IDEA. In the 
fall of 1993, their parents became dissatisfied with their 
sons' IEPs and obtained IEEs of them. From November 
1993 until May 1994, the parents were in discussions with 
the District over the design of appropriate IEPs for their 
sons but failed to reach agreement. At the end of the 1993- 
94 school year, the District sent the parents revised IEPs 
for both Warren and Grant together with a notice of 
parents' rights. The parents responded in August 1994, by 
advising that they were withdrawing Warren and Grant 
from the District and enrolling them in the Janus School 
("Janus"), a private school for students with learning 
disabilities. On September 9, 1994, the District notified the 
parents of their right to have the children educated at 
Janus at their own expense but warned that if they wished 
to challenge the District's IEPs and receive tuition 
reimbursement, they would have to request a due process 
hearing. 
 
The parents did not make such a request for tuition 
reimbursement or, in the alternative, for a hearing, until 
December 1995, sixteen months later. The District rejected 
the request for reimbursement, but offered to develop 
updated IEPs and agreed to a hearing. Hearings for both 
children were held between July and October 1996. The 
hearing officer issued separate opinions, finding the 
District's proposed IEPs appropriate and denying the 
request for reimbursement for tuition and for the cost of 
the IEEs. The parents appealed to the Panel, which 
reversed. In separate opinions, the Panel found both 
Grant's and Warren's IEPs inappropriate. With respect to 
Grant, it found that the District was liable prospectively for 
tuition reimbursement for violating its duty to provide a 
"defensible IEP" but reduced its liability by the equivalent of 
one semester (the last semester of the 1995-96 school year) 
because of the unreasonableness of the parents' demands. 
With respect to Warren, the Panel also held that because 
the District had violated its "clear duty to provide a 
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reasonably defensible proposed IEP" it was liable 
prospectively for tuition reimbursement but reduced its 
liability (by deferring reimbursement until the second 
semester of the 1996-97 school year) by the equivalent of 
one year because of the "excessiveness of the parents' 
conduct." The Panel also denied reimbursement for the 
IEEs on equitable grounds, both because the parents had 
not expressed disagreement with the District's IEE and 
because they had waited for over two and one-half years to 
seek reimbursement. 
 
Plaintiffs appealed to the District Court. The court, on 
cross-motions for summary judgment, affirmed the Panel, 
except with respect to the IEE reimbursement. Plaintiffs 
now appeal from the District Court's judgment and the 
District cross-appeals contending that all tuition 
reimbursement should be denied because Janus was not a 
proper private placement and that IEE reimbursement 
should be denied because the school district's evaluations 
were appropriate. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
former 20 U.S.C. S 1415(e)(2) (1994) (amended in 1997 as 
20 U.S.C. S 1415(I)(2)(A)).1 We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 (1994), and we"exercise 
plenary review over the district court's conclusions of law 
and review its findings of fact for clear error." See Carlisle 




I. REIMBURSEMENT FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION 
 
A. Proper Private Placement 
 
The District contends that Janus is not a proper 
placement because it is not an approved private school in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The IDEA was amended in 1997, resulting in a renumbering of its 
sections. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-117, 111 Stat. 37 (hereinafter 1997 Amendments). 
We discuss the effect of the 1997 Amendments below. 
 
2. We have considered and deny the District's motion to file a 
supplemental appendix. 
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Pennsylvania and does not comply with Pennsylvania's 
licensure requirements or the state's educational 
standards. Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 
510 U.S. 7, 14 (1993), disposes of the District's contention. 
There, the Court held that a private school's failure to meet 
state education standards is not a bar to reimbursement 
under the IDEA. Insofar as the District's argument is based 
on particular alleged deficiencies, in the absence of any 
showing of clear error, we defer to the Panel's and the 
District Court's finding that Janus is an appropriate 
placement. 
 
The District further contends that because only students 
with learning disabilities attend Janus, it did not provide 
the least restrictive environment--that is, an environment 
where disabled and nondisabled children are integrated to 
the maximum extent possible--as required by the IDEA. 
See 20 U.S.C. S 1412(5)(B) (1994) (now 20 U.S.C. 
S 1412(a)(5)(A)). The District Court held, relying on 
Cleveland Heights-University Heights City School District v. 
Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 399-400 (6th Cir. 1998), that Janus's 
failure to provide Grant and Warren with opportunities to 
interact with nondisabled students did not render it an 
inappropriate placement, reasoning that imposition of the 
least-restrictive environment requirement on private 
placements would vitiate the parental right of unilateral 
withdrawal. Subsequently, in Ridgewood Board of 
Education v. N.E., this court reached the same conclusion, 
holding that when the public school fails to provide an 
appropriate IEP, tuition reimbursement may be made to 
students placed in private schools that specialize in 
educating students with learning disabilities. See 172 F.3d 
at 245, 249 (citing Boss and other authorities). The least- 
restrictive environment requirement does not bar 
reimbursement because "the IDEA requires that disabled 
students be educated in the least restrictive appropriate 
educational environment." Id. An appropriate private 
placement is not disqualified because it is a more restrictive 
environment than that of the public placement. See id. 
Thus, the test for the parents' private placement is that it 
is appropriate, and not that it is perfect. See id. at 249 n.8. 
"Since the court was presented with only one option, it was 
not required to locate another school that would satisfy the 
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least restrictive alternative requirement based on the entire 
pool of schools available, but rather was required simply to 
determine whether that one available choice would provide 
an appropriate education for [the student]." Board of Educ. 
v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162, 1168 (7th Cir. 
1994). Both the Panel and the District Court having found 
that the Janus School offered an appropriate education for 
Grant and Warren, the parents are not barred from tuition 
reimbursement. 
 
B. Reductions of Tuition Reimbursement 
 
       1. Tuition Prior to Parents' Request for Due Process 
       Hearing 
 
Relying on Bernardsville Board of Education v. J.H., 42 
F.3d 149 (1994), the District Court, affirming the Panel, 
rejected plaintiffs' claim for tuition reimbursement for the 
sixteen- month period during which Grant and Warren 
were enrolled at Janus prior to the parents' request for a 
due process hearing in December 1995. Plaintiffs did not 
challenge this ruling in their brief on appeal butfirst raised 
the issue at oral argument. " `An issue is waived unless a 
party raises it in its opening brief . . . .' " See Reform Party 
v. Allegheny County Dept. of Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 316 
n.11 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Laborers' Int'l Union v. Foster 
Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994)). Even if we 
were to consider this claim, we would be bound by our 
decision in Bernardsville holding that when parents 
unilaterally withdraw their children from public school, 
absent mitigating circumstances, they are not entitled to 
reimbursement for private school tuition until they request 
review proceedings. See Bernardsville, 42 F.3d at 156-58 & 
n.14 ("[T]he right of review contains a corresponding 
parental duty to unequivocally place in issue the 
appropriateness of an IEP. This is accomplished through 
the initiation of review proceedings within a reasonable 
time of the unilateral placement for which reimbursement 
is sought."). Bernardsville does not establish a one-year 
grace period as plaintiffs argue. In Bernardsville, parents 
who waited over two years to initiate proceedings were 
denied reimbursement for the entire two-year period and 
were not simply excused for their first year of inaction. See 
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id. at 158 ("We think more than two years, indeed, more 
than one year, without mitigating excuse, is an 
unreasonable delay."). In the absence of any mitigating 
excuse, the District Court appropriately denied tuition 
reimbursement for the period preceding the parents' 
request for a due process hearing. 
 
       2. Tuition Reduction Because of 
       Parents' Unreasonable Conduct 
 
The Panel reduced the District's liability for tuition 
reimbursement on equitable grounds by one semester in 
the case of Grant and two semesters in the case of Warren. 
In its decision regarding Grant, the Panel, afterfinding that 
the District had failed to comply with the IDEA, determined 
that it nevertheless "merits high marks with regard to the 
procedure and, in terms of parental participation, patience." 
As for the parents, it faulted them for making unrealistic 
and unreasonable demands, providing inaccurate 
information, contradicting themselves and making false 
accusations against the District. After acknowledging the 
need for and right to vigorous parental representation of 
their children, it determined that "the cumulative extent 
has the equitable effect of reducing the requested 
reimbursement by the equivalent of one semester." In the 
case of Warren, the Panel, after finding that the IEP was 
insufficient, determined: 
 
       [T]he residual excessiveness of the parents' conduct, 
       after due latitude for vigorous parental participation 
       and advocacy, combined with the marginal 
       inappropriateness of the District's proposed program 
       and the marginal appropriateness of the private school 
       program to have the equitable effect of reducing the 
       requested reimbursement by the equivalent of one 
       year. 
 
The District Court accepted the Panel's findings and 
conclusions. It held that the Panel properly considered the 
parents' conduct in its equitable analysis, reasoning that 
the IDEA does not provide an absolute right to 
reimbursement but, rather, authorizes courts to fashion 
"appropriate" relief. It concluded: 
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       To reward the parents' uncooperative and 
       unreasonable conduct in the face of good faith 
       attempts by the District would little serve IDEA's 
       purpose of providing disabled children with a free 
       appropriate public education through the cooperation 
       of school officials and parents. 
 
The IDEA (both as it stood at the time of the events in 
question and under the 1997 Amendments) "authorizes 
federal assistance to states and localities for educational 
programs which confer an educational benefit on disabled 
students. The [District] receives an allocation of funds 
under this Act and, thus, incurs the responsibility to confer 
an educational benefit on learning disabled students 
enrolled in a public school within its jurisdiction." 
Bernardsville, 42 F.3d at 151; see also 20 U.S.C. SS 1411, 
1412(1) (1994) (requiring that "[t]he State has in effect a 
policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a 
free appropriate public education"); Burlington Sch. Comm. 
v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985) 
(stating that "the Act provides federal money to state and 
local educational agencies that undertake to implement the 
substantive and procedural requirements of the Act"). State 
and local educational agencies are required to establish and 
maintain procedures to assure that handicapped children 
and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards 
with respect to the provision of free appropriate public 
education. See 20 U.S.C. S 1415(a) (1994). Aggrieved parties 
are entitled to bring a civil action in state or federal courts 
which "shall grant such relief as the court determines is 
appropriate." See 20 U.S.C. S 1415(e)(2) (1994). 
 
In Burlington the Court considered the scope of the 
district court's remedial power under S 1415(e)(2) in the 
context of affirming the right of parents to tuition 
reimbursement pending the due process hearing on a 
proposed IEP. Referring to the statutory text, the Court 
stated: 
 
       The ordinary meaning of these words confers broad 
       discretion on the court. The type of relief is not further 
       specified, except that it must be "appropriate." Absent 
       other reference, the only possible interpretation is that 
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       the relief is to be "appropriate" in light of the purpose 
       of the Act. 
 
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369. The Court went on to hold that 
a parental violation of S 1415(e)(3), which requires a child to 
remain in its current educational placement during review 
proceedings, does not constitute a waiver of 
reimbursement. It said that if S 1415(e)(3) were to be 
interpreted to cut off parental rights to reimbursement, the 
principal purpose of the Act would in many cases be 
defeated in the same way as if reimbursement were never 
available. See id. at 372. It added that"[t]he Act was 
intended to give handicapped children both an appropriate 
education and a free one; it should not be interpreted to 
defeat one or the other of those objectives." Id. 
 
Although the facts in Burlington are distinguishable, the 
situation presented is analogous. The conduct of parents 
should not be permitted to defeat the purpose of the Act, 
and the remedial power of the court should not be 
interpreted to further such an end. The same generous view 
of the IDEA's broad remedial purpose is reflected in the 
Court's subsequent decision in Florence County v. Carter, 
which held that a private school's failure to meet state 
education standards is not a bar to reimbursement. Carter 
indicates that the amount of tuition reimbursement may be 
limited "if the Court determines that the cost of the private 
education was unreasonable," Carter, 510 U.S. at 16; we do 
not read it as sanctioning a denial of an arbitrary fraction 
of reimbursement for a portion of the school year where the 
IEPs are found deficient but the parents' conduct was 
unreasonable. Here it is undisputed that the District failed 
to come forward with appropriate IEPs and there is no 
finding that the parents' conduct obstructed its ability to do 
so. In those circumstances it makes little sense to 
determine the amount of reimbursement not with reference 
to what is required by the IDEA to provide an appropriate 
education but by comparing the conduct of the school 
district with that of the parents, as was done here. 
 
We reject the approach taken by the Panel and the 
District Court for the further reason that it flies into the 
face of the policy underlying the IDEA emphasizing parent 
involvement. By " `emphasiz[ing] the process of parent and 
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child involvement and . . . provid[ing] a written record of 
reasonable expectations, the [Senate] Committee intend[ed] 
to clarify that such individualized planning conferences are 
a way to provide parent involvement and protection to 
assure that appropriate services are provided to a 
handicapped child.' " Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 208-09 (1982) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-168 at 11-12 
(1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1435-36); see 
also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 368 ("In several places, the Act 
emphasizes the participation of the parents in developing 
the child's educational program and assessing its 
effectiveness."). Vigorous advocacy is an anticipated by- 
product of a policy encouraging parental involvement. See 
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209 (discussing Congress' intent to 
protect children through parental involvement and 
commenting that "parents . . . will not lack ardor in seeking 
to ensure that handicapped children receive all of the 
benefits to which they are entitled by the Act"). The rulings 
in this case undermine that policy by placing parents at 
risk that their advocacy may be found extreme at the cost 
of full reimbursement. Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment insofar it denies full reimbursement for Grant's 
and Warren's tuition commencing with the second semester 
of the 1995-96 school year.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. As noted above, Congress amended the IDEA in 1997 by providing 
that "[t]he cost of reimbursement . . . may be reduced or denied -- upon 
a judicial finding of unreasonableness with respect to actions taken by 
the parents." 20 U.S.C.A. S 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III) (West Supp. 1999). 
The 
District Court held that the amendment did not apply because all of the 
events in this case occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment, 
June 4, 1997, and neither party has challenged that ruling. We agree. 
The court's ruling was consistent with the position taken by all other 
courts of appeals that have addressed the issue. See Peter v. Wedl, 155 
F.3d 992, 998-99 (8th Cir. 1998); Muller v. Committee on Special Educ., 
145 F.3d 95, 97 n.1 (2d Cir. 1998); Sellers v. School Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 
526 n.2 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 168 (1998); Tucker v. 
Calloway 
County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 1998); Fowler v. Unified 
Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1997); Heather S. v. 
Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1047 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997); Cypress-Fairbanks 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 247 n.1 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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II. REIMBURSEMENT FOR INDEPENDENT 
    EDUCATIONAL EVALUATIONS 
 
In its cross-appeal, the District contends that the District 
Court erred in awarding reimbursement to the parents for 
the 1993 IEEs of Grant and Warren.4 
 
At the due process hearings, the hearing officer found 
that the evaluations of Grant and Warren obtained by the 
District in 1992 were appropriate and, therefore, denied 
reimbursement to the parents. On appeal the Panel 
evaluated the equities. With respect to Grant's IEE, the 
Panel found that the District did rely on the IEE results in 
reconsidering Grant's IEP, but because of doubts 
concerning the evaluator's impartiality, the parents' failure 
to express disagreement with the District's evaluation and 
their delay in requesting reimbursement, law and equity 
preponderated in favor of denying reimbursement. With 
respect to Warren's IEE, the Panel determined that its 
"apparent value in terms of triggering the District's initial 
eligibility reevaluation and being incorporated in the final 
CER-IEP are forfeited based on" the parents' failure to 
express disagreement with the District's evaluations and 
their delay in seeking reimbursement. 
 
The District Court rejected the equitable balancing 
analysis on the ground that a parent has an unqualified 
right under the IDEA's implementing regulations to 
reimbursement unless the District's evaluation is found to 
be appropriate: 
 
       A parent has the right to an independent educational 
       evaluation at public expense if the parent disagrees 
       with an evaluation obtained by the public agency. 
       However, the public agency may initiate a hearing . . . 
       to show that its evaluation is appropriate. If thefinal 
       decision is that the evaluation is appropriate, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although the parents obtained additional IEEs in other years, IDEA 
regulations permit only one IEE per child at public expense. See 34 
C.F.R. S 300.503(b) (1993); Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d at 1169. 
The district court interpreted the parents' request as a request for 
reimbursement of the 1993 IEEs and the parents do not take issue with 
that interpretation on appeal. 
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       parent still has the right to an independent educational 
       evaluation, but not at public expense. 
 
34 C.F.R. S 300.503(b) (1991). Moreover, the parents' failure 
to express disagreement with the District's evaluations prior 
to obtaining their own does not foreclose their right to 
reimbursement. See Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d at 
1169; Hudson v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 1059, 1065 (4th Cir. 
1987). To accept the District's argument would render the 
regulation pointless because the object of parents' obtaining 
their own evaluation is to determine whether grounds exist 
to challenge the District's. See Hudson, 828 F.2d at 1065. 
 
The District Court went on to hold that the hearing 
officer's findings that the District's evaluations of Grant and 
Warren were appropriate were unsupported by substantial 
evidence. It found the primary deficiency in these 
evaluations to be their failure to uncover the specific areas 
of Grant's and Warren's learning disabilities. See 34 C.F.R. 
S 300.532(b) (1991) (requiring that the public agency use 
"[t]ests and other evaluation materials . . . tailored to assess 
specific areas of educational need"); 34 C.F.R.S300.532(f) 
(1991) (requiring that a child be "assessed in all areas 
related to the suspected disability"). The inappropriateness 
of the District's evaluation is further demonstrated by the 
fact that it was the parents' evaluator who identified the 
boys' specific problem areas: In Grant's case, punctuation, 
spelling and writing comprehension, and in Warren's, 
dyslexia. We find no clear error in the District Court's 
findings and agree that plaintiffs are entitled to be 




We AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court in all 
respects except for its denial of reimbursement for tuition 
for both Grant and Warren commencing with the second 
semester of the 1995-96 school year, and REMAND for 
entry of a revised judgment. 
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